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Available online 1 November 2013Stringent long-term climate targets necessitate a limit on cumulative emissions in this century
for which sufficient policy signals are lacking. Using nine energy-economy models, we explore
how policies pursued during the next two decades impact long-term transformation pathways
towards stringent long-term climate targets. Less stringent near-term policies (i.e., those
with larger emissions) consume more of the long-term cumulative emissions budget in the
2010–2030 period, which increases the likelihood of overshooting the budget and the urgency
of reducing GHG emissions after 2030. Furthermore, the larger near-term GHG emissions
associated with less stringent policies are generated primarily by additional coal-based
electricity generation. Therefore, to be successful in meeting the long-term target despite
near-term emissions reductions that are weaker than those implied by cost-optimal mitigation
pathways, models must prematurely retire significant coal capacity while rapidly ramping
up low-carbon technologies between 2030 and 2050 and remove large quantities of CO2 from
the atmosphere in the latter half of the century. While increased energy efficiency lowers
mitigation costs considerably, even with weak near-term policies, it does not substantially
reduce the short-term reliance on coal electricity. However, increased energy efficiency does
allow the energy system more flexibility in mitigating emissions and, thus, facilitates the
post-2030 transition.








In the last four climate conferences in Copenhagen,
Cancún, Durban and Doha, the international community has
agreed on the target of limiting the increase in global average
temperature to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, while noting
the “significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties'
mitigation pledges […] and aggregate emission pathways2 Potsdam, Germany.
am).
c. This is an open access articleconsistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase
in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C” [1,2].
While the discrepancy between mitigation pledges and
required near-term emission levels implied by cost-optimal
mitigation pathways towards 2 °C is well founded on previous
research [3,4], the exact implications of higher-than-optimal
emissions in the near term are lesswell explored. In an effort to
inform societies and policy makers of the implications of
proposed near-termmitigation pledges, the AMPERE study [5],
on which this paper is based, examines the consequences of
scenarios with different global emission levels in 2030, which
correspond with current 2020 pledges extrapolated to 2030under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1 Here we use the term carbon lock-in to describe how less-than-optimal
climate policies result in an energy system conﬁguration that is more
emissions-intensive than implied by optimal climate policies. In contrast to
Davis et al., we do not quantify the contribution of this excess fossil-based
infrastructure to future emissions.
2 The model with temporal modeling scope until 2050 (DNE21+) has to
fulﬁll a cumulative budget of 1500 Gt CO2 in the period 2000–2050, which is
broadly comparable to the emissions of the other models in that time span
(see Section 4.1). For the two models that do not include land-use CO2
emissions (IMACLIM and POLES), the budget is only 1400 Gt CO2. Models
considering further GHGs beyond CO2 apply an equivalent price to those
emissions, using global warming potentials (GWPs) for the price conversion.
63C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72[6,7]. Complementing the companion AMPERE papers that
focus on mitigation costs and feasibility [5] and technology
deployment sensitivities and regional implications [8], this
paper explores the implications of different short-term
emissions targets for the transformation of the global energy
system.
Understanding the differences in energy system
transformation pathways helps to explain the economic costs
and feasibility of scenarios with higher near-term emissions.
Additionally it can indicate how excess costs can be alleviated,
but also where real world barriers not included in the models
can lead to even higher costs than reported by the models. To
examine energy system transformation, we use a set of results
from nine global energy-economy models participating in the
AMPERE project to explore: 1) path dependency that results
from the inertia of energy systems with long-lived
infrastructure and 2) the implications of larger near-term
emissions for the timing and magnitude of future mitigation.
As near-term emissions targets become less stringent
(i.e., emissions increase), the deployment of fossil energy
infrastructure with long lifetimes, such as coal-fired
power plants, is expanded. This additional carbon-intensive
infrastructure potentially represents a long-term emissions
commitment or carbon lock-in, which can threaten the
likelihood of meeting more stringent long-term climate
objectives, such as the 2 °C target. Reaching the long-term
stabilization target typically requires premature retirement or
retrofit with carbon capture and storage (CCS) once the policy
regime is strengthened in 2030, without prior anticipation by
economic agents. Both of these options result in significant
additional system costs, either through the write-off of stranded
investments or the installation of CCS infrastructure [9].
Moreover, the rate at which these options can be
deployed may be limited by technological limitations, social
acceptance, and the ability to ramp-up additional low-carbon
energy capacities as a substitute. Thus, this capital inertia
causes some degree of path dependency, which limits the
degree to which emissions can deviate from their previous
trajectory.
In addition, because of the long residence time of CO2 in
the atmosphere, climate stabilization requires the solution of
a stock problem. Climate change in a given year is largely
determined by the cumulative anthropogenic emissions.
Therefore, achieving long-term climate objectives becomes
more difficult as 2030 emissions increase as a result of
two distinct processes: 1) carbon budget depletion: larger
pre-2030 emissions consume a higher share of the allowable
CO2 emissions budget, so that post-2030 emissions must be
smaller and 2) carbon lock-in: the larger annual emissions
and more carbon- and energy-intensive capital stock in 2030
significantly increases the rate at which the energy system
must be transformed and increases the cost of reaching
a particular level of emission reductions relative to the
previous trajectory.
For the remainder of this paper, we consequently refer to
carbon lock-in as the degree to which the configuration of the
energy system in 2030 is less than optimal, thus increasing
the difficulty of emission reductions achieved post-2030. We
do this being well aware that the models are only able to
capture the restricted aspect of carbon lock-in associated
with physical capital and emissions while institutional andother aspects of this phenomenon [10] are not modeled and
hence not the subject of this study. Furthermore, currently
existing energy infrastructure also constitutes a considerable
emissions commitment and hence carbon lock-in today [11].1
Our study thus explores how much this lock-in is increased
by policies that institute only modest mitigation over the
next two decades and what this lock-in implies for the
long-term energy system transformation that is required for
achieving a low stabilization target.
We present the modeling and scenario framework of
this study in Section 2 and discuss the magnitude and
composition of the lock-in attained in 2030 in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the long-term budget implications of both
the carbon budget depletion and the lock-in from both
temporal and sectoral perspectives and Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of the results.2. Study design and methods
This cross-cut analysis is part of the AMPERE model
inter-comparison study, which examines mitigation timing
and alternative technology futures and is described in detail
in the overview article of this special issue [5]. A total of
nine energy-economy and integrated assessment models
participated in the study (Table 1). To improve comparability
of results, model assumptions on regional GDP trajectories and
global long-term final energy demand levels were harmonized
for the baseline scenarios.
Table 2 provides an overview of the scenarios considered
in this paper. They comprise a subset of the scenarios
prepared for the AMPERE study [5] and are specifically
designed to explore the two phenomena of carbon lock-in
and carbon budget depletion explained in Section 1. The
baseline scenarios (“Base”) represent a future in which the
energy system develops without climate policy while the
climate mitigation scenarios (“450”) must fulfill a constraint
on cumulative CO2 emissions, including land use emissions,
from 2000 to 2100 of 1500 Gt CO2 [5].2 This is roughly
consistent with a limitation of the atmospheric greenhouse
gas (GHG) concentration to 450 ppm CO2e in 2100, and
implies an about 60–70% likelihood of keeping temperature
change relative to pre-industrial levels in 2100 below 2 °C
[12]. The analysis presented in this paper considers
only scenarios in which the full portfolio of technologies
represented in each model is available, both with reference
energy intensity (FullTech) and lower energy intensity as a
sensitivity analysis (LowEI). For the FullTech scenarios, the
observed rate of energy intensity improvement of roughly1.3%
per year is assumed to be continued in the future, leading to a
3 The short-term targets are speciﬁed as annual emission levels in 2030.
The scenarios assume a smooth development of climate policies with
comparable ambition levels before 2030. For models with perfect foresight,
myopic behavior was mimicked by using a two-phase approach. In the ﬁrst
stage, a perfect foresight scenario is run with a long-term ambition level –
generally considerably lower than in the 450 policy scenarios – that allows
the model to hit the near-term target in 2030. This ﬁrst run is used to ﬁx the
solution through 2030, and then another perfect foresight scenario is run
with the long-term budget target. The exact implementation has been the
choice of the individual modeling teams, as long as it was made sure that the
model has limited foresight when planning prior to 2030.
Fig. 1. Historic global CO2 emissions until 2010 and projected emissions until 2030 for the 450-FullTech-HST scenario based on the REMIND model. The bar plots
on the right side indicate projected CO2 emissions in 2030 by the REMIND model for the four FullTech scenarios. The vertical black lines indicate the full range of
total CO2 emissions across the nine models and the grey boxes the interquartile range. Historic data is from Refs. [17,20,21]. Definitions of variables can be found
in the AMPERE database and derived variables are defined in the supporting online material
Table 1
Models participating in this study. Premature retirement in REMIND is constrained to max. 4% of total capacity per year, so that full retirement is completed only
after 25 years. While the percentage of retired capital thus increases linearly, actual retirement is faster due to the additional effect of normal retirement after the



















Short form D G I i M m P R W
Time horizon 2050 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100
Premature retirement Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes, 4% p.a. Yes
Max. primary energy biomass (EJ) 151 880 278 266 189 221 211 306 275
Table 2
Scenarios analyzed in this study. The codes in parentheses will be used throughout this study to refer to the scenarios. The 450-FullTech-LST and
450-FullTech-HST scenarios will be referred to in short as LST and HST respectively.
No climate policy (Base) Centennial CO2 emission budget constraint of 1500 Gt CO2 (450 ppm CO2e)
Full when-flexibility (OPT) Low short term target (LST) High short term target (HST)
Reference energy intensity (FullTech) Base-FullTech-OPT 450-FullTech-OPT 450-FullTech-LST 450-FullTech-HST
Low energy intensity (LowEI) Base-LowEI-OPT 450-LowEI-OPT 450-LowEI-LST 450-LowEI-HST
64 C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72global final energy demand of 910–1000 EJ in 2100 [5]. Higher
energy intensity improvement rates of ~1.9% per year are
assumed to happen autonomously without additional policies
or costs in the LowEI scenarios, resulting in 520–570 EJ final
energy demand in 2100. An in-depth analysis of scenarios
with limited technological representation is presented in the
companion cross-cut paper [8].
To study carbon lock-in, we consider scenarios with
prescribed (typically sub-optimal) short-termmitigation targets
in 2030, along with scenarios with full when-flexibility and an
optimal distribution of emission reductions over time. The
scenarios with prescribed 2030 targets were constructed as
two-stage scenarios in models with perfect foresight, so that
they run inmyopicmode until 2030with no anticipation of thepost-2030 policy signal before 20303 (see Bosetti et al. [13] and
Richels et al. [14] for a discussion with the opposite cases of
anticipated policy changes). Specifically, the model considers
Fig. 2. Differences in a) CO2 emissions by sources, and b) primary energy types between 450-FullTech-HST and 450-FullTech-OPT in 2030. Dashed lines indicate
reference values in 2010 [22]
65C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72two short-term targets: high (“HST”) and low (“LST”). In the
HST scenarios, the target for total Kyoto gas emissions in 2030
is 60.8 Gt CO2e and in the LST scenarios the target is 52.8 Gt
CO2e in 2030.4 As seen in Fig. 1, the HST scenarios imply
weaker-than-optimal mitigation efforts and hence policies
until 2030. Therefore we refer to the HST scenarios as weak
policy scenarios in relation to the OPT scenarios. However, the
weak designation should only be understood in a relative sense
and does not imply any absolute valuation of the considered
policy targets.
The short-term targets were developed by extrapolating
the 2020 pledges under the UNFCCC to 2030 and reflect likely
emissions outcomes for stringent fulfillment of those pledges
(LST) and a more lenient case (HST) where only unconditional
pledges are fulfilled [5]. For most models, the two targets lie
within the range spanned by the baseline scenario on the high
end and the optimal 450 scenario on the low end, although
there is an overlap between optimal scenarios and those with4 Models that cover only industrial and energy related CO2 emissions
(IMACLIM and POLES) must comply with targets for fossil fuels and industry
CO2 emissions of 44.2 and 37.3 Gt CO2 in the HST and LST scenarios,
respectively.low short term targets (see bars on the right side of Fig. 1). The
left side of Fig. 1 compares the trajectory of historic CO2
emissions with the trajectory projected until 2030 by REMIND
for the 450-FullTech-HST scenario. Although the HST scenario
represents the highest 2030 CO2 emissions of any of the
450 ppm mitigation scenarios and, thus, the most carbon
budget depletion and lock-in, it still implies significantly lower
emission growth rates than those observed in the last decade.
The LST scenario represents an intermediate level of carbon
lock-in and roughly implies a return to current emission levels
by 2030. Finally, in the first best climate policy scenario
(450-FullTech-OPT), 2030 emissions are considerably lower
than those in 2010 for themajority of models. The difference in
emissions between the HST and the 450-OPT scenario is
roughly 15 Gt CO2 for most models, or close to 50% of total
2010 emissions.
3. Energy System in 2030: Which sectors contribute most
to carbon lock-in?
This section evaluates carbon lock-in and its main
contributors for scenarios with sub-optimal short-term
emission targets (LST and HST). Specifically, the sectors
Fig. 3. Differences in a) electricity generation, and b) final energy by carrier between 450-FullTech-HST and 450-FullTech-OPT in 2030. Dashed lines indicate
reference values in 2010 [22]
66 C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72that contribute most to carbon lock-in are identified by
calculating the difference in energy system deployment and
CO2 emissions relative to 450-OPT scenarios for each sector
in 2030, which is when the near-term target is specified and
the myopic period ends.
While total 2030 emissions are exogenously prescribed via
the short-term target definitions in the HST and LST scenarios,
the sectoral composition of the emissions is an endogenous
model outcome. By contrast, 2030 emissions in theOPT scenarios
are determined endogenously in each model. Consequently, the
overall size and composition of the CO2 emissions gap between
the HST and 450-OPT scenarios shown in Fig. 2a vary across
models.While GCAM identifies a very small gap of less than 1 Gt
CO2, the range across the rest of the models is 8–24 Gt CO2,5
which is comparable to 21–65% of total global CO2 emissions in5 The high short term target does not make a substantial difference for the
GCAMmodel, as this model projects a high overshoot of the long-term target
and subsequent carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the atmosphere, even
under full when-ﬂexibility. Other models do not have the possibility for such
high amounts of CDR, mainly because of limits on the production of biomass,
but also because of limits on the geological sequestration of carbon dioxide,
or the absence of bioplastics sequestration.2010. Most models indicate that more than half of the foregone
emissions abatement is attributed to the electricity supply.
Generally, the second largest contribution comes fromadditional
demand-side emissions from the consumption of combustible
fuels.
As expected, the less ambitious emission reductions in the
HST scenario are caused by greater deployment of fossil
primary energy without carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) relative to the OPT scenario (Fig. 2b). The increase in
fossil primary energy demand amounts to 90–270 EJ, which
compares to 431 EJ of fossil energy use observed in 2010.
Within the group of fossil fuels, coal exhibits the largest
increase in deployment. Furthermore, we observe less
deployment of low-carbon energy sources and a substantial
net increase of primary energy of 50–200 EJ.
Increased fossil fuel use is also evident in the electricity
sector where significantly more electricity is generated using
coal and gas plants without CCS in the HST scenario (Fig. 3a).
Coal-based electricity generation increases up to 17 PWh or
60 EJ, compared to total global electricity generation of 21 PWh
or77 EJ in2010. In addition, low-carbongeneration technologies,
such as coal and gas with CCS, nuclear, biomass and other
renewables, are deployed at lower levels. Consequently, the
67C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72price of electricity is smaller in the HST scenario until 2030,
resulting in a greater net demand for electricity. The increase in
electricity generation with fossil fuels generates much of the
surplus emissions until 2030 and the underinvestment into
low-carbon options leads to higher ramp-up rate requirements
for these options after 2030, particularly in the two subsequent
decades [8].
Regarding differences in final energy use by carrier, it is
noteworthy to observe that electricity makes up only a small
portion of the additional final energy use relative to the OPT
scenario (Fig. 3b). The HST scenario tends to yield lower
price-induced energy efficiency improvements until 2030,
resulting in a difference in total final energy use compared to
OPT of up to one third of 2010 total final energy use.
Figs. 2 and 3 suggest that the difference in emissions
abatement in the year 2030 between the HST and OPT
scenario is primarily the result of two processes: 1) end-use
efficiency improvements are higher in the OPT scenarios than
in the HST scenarios and in most models the difference is
evenly distributed across the different end-use fuel types;
and 2) the carbon intensity of electricity supply is much
further reduced in the OPT scenario than in the HST scenario,
whereas the carbon intensity of non-electric final energy
supply is not significantly lowered in comparison to the
baseline even in the OPT scenario (Fig. 4). This pattern
reflects the greater difficulty and cost of emissions reductions
in non-electric energy supply [15,16] and the comparatively
low marginal abatement costs for many efficiency measures
and the substitution of coal-based electricity generation with
low-carbon alternatives.
The substitution of low-carbon alternatives for coal is
comparatively cheap because new generation capacities must
be built anyway, given the projected rise in electricity demand
across the world. In the optimal policy scenario, all models
foresee stagnation or even a net decline in installed capacity for
coal-based electricity generation without CCS in 2030 relative
to 2010. By contrast, the HST scenario implies a net increase of
these capacities in most models (Fig. 5a). Even if the totalFig. 4. Carbon intensity of secondary energy electricity (left panel) and final energy
mark the median level across all models, the colored boxes indicate the interquartil
the values associated with each model (see Table 1 for full model names). The dashcapacity stagnates for the next two decades, significant new
capacity will still be required to replace retired facilities. Since
coal power plants are characterized by long technical lifetimes,
typically ranging from 30 to 50 years, any new capacity built
over the next two decades will contribute to significant lock-in
of carbon intensive generation. In the HST climate mitigation
scenarios in which the electricity sector must rapidly
decarbonize after 2030, most models, must prematurely retire
and thus strand large amounts of this coal capacity (Fig. 5b).
Johnson et al. [9] discusses the costs and implications of
stranded coal capacity given various near-term emissions
targets.
In the LowEI scenarios, total installed coal capacities
under short-term targets are very similar to those found in
the reference energy intensity (FullTech) scenarios even
though overall final energy demand is much smaller (Fig. 5a).
This means that the end-use efficiency improvements, which
are assumed to happen autonomously (i.e. without any costs
involved), in these scenarios, reduce the urgency of transitioning
to low-carbon electricity generation. Consequently, the carbon
intensity of electricity is higher in the LowEI HST and LST
scenarios than in the corresponding FullTech scenarios (Fig. 4a).
While in general it is a trivial result that with fixed emission
targets, scenarios with less energy demand yield higher
carbon intensities, it is noteworthy that coal-based electricity
generation, which involves very long-lived capital stocks, is
nearly identical in the LowEI and FullTech scenarios.
The main insight from the analysis in this section is that
the majority of foregone abatement options in the LST and
HST scenarios are reductions in coal-based electricity production.
As the corresponding production capacities represent long-lived
capital assets, the expansion of coal constitutes a considerable
lock-in of carbon-intensive technologies. Meanwhile, reduced
investment in low-carbon technologies means that the share
of these technologies remains low in 2030. In combination,
these developments pose a considerable challenge for the rapid
transition to low-carbon energy that is required in the following
decades to limit warming to 2 °C.without electricity (right panel) in 2030 for all eight scenarios. The red lines
e ranges and the whiskers indicate the full model ranges. The letters indicate
ed horizontal line marks the 2010 historic value [22].
Fig. 5. Total installed capacity for coal-based electricity generation without CCS in 2030 (left) and stranded capacity of coal electricity without CCS measured in
cumulative unused capacities from 2035 to 2100 and expressed both in TWyears and Gt CO2 (secondary y-axis, right). For the calculation of equivalent emissions
we assume a constant emission factor of 850 g/kWh. The red lines mark the median level across all models, the colored boxes indicate the interquartile ranges
and the whiskers indicate the full model ranges. The letters indicate the values associated with each model (see Table 1 for full model names). The dashed
horizontal line marks the 2010 historic value [22].
6 See Ref. [5] for discussion of the infeasibility concept and the risk for
infeasibility of the scenarios.
7 The model with time horizons until 2050 (DNE21+) must by scenario
design meet the budget level in 2050 and, thus, cannot overshoot the
budget.
8 Although IMAGE and IMACLIM are also part of this project, they both
found the 450-FullTech-HST scenario to be infeasible.
9 The IMAGE model is the only exception since it is in the "high response"
group, but infeasible for the 450-FullTech-HST scenario. IMAGE is one of two
models participating in this study with no possibility for early retirement of
existing capacities, which explains the infeasibility.
68 C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–724. The effects of short-term emission targets on long-term
emission patterns
This section discusses the temporal and sectoral allocations
of the allowable CO2 budget in scenarios with optimal versus
weak near-term policies and describes the differences in these
allocations among models.
4.1. Exhausting the emissions budget
Achieving stringent long-term climate protection targets
requires that cumulative emissions of CO2 are strictly limited.
In the 450 ppm scenarios considered in this study, less than
1200 Gt CO2 can still be emitted between 2010 and 2100, as
more than 300 Gt have been emitted from 2000 to 2009 [17].
For comparison, more than 1600 Gt CO2 of anthropogenic
emissions have been emitted in the 90 years between 1920
and 2009. Even under the assumption of immediate action as
in the 450-OPT scenario, more than half of the 2010–2100
budget will be consumed within the next two decades, which
leaves only 400–550 Gt CO2 for the period from 2030 to 2100
(Fig. 6). As emissions until 2030 are even larger in the HST
scenario, the budget for the remaining seven decades of the
21st century would be reduced to 320–410 Gt CO2, thus
increasing the challenge significantly.
Themagnitude of the challenge becomes evident when one
examines the cumulative emissions in 2050 for both scenarios.
In the 450-OPT scenario, roughly half the models already
exhibit an overshoot over the allowable CO2 emissions budget
in 2050, making the achievement of the long-term budget
dependent on successful removal of considerable amounts of
CO2 in the second half of the century. For all but one model,
cumulative emissions until 2050 are considerably larger in the
HST scenario, which increases the need for carbon dioxide
removal (CDR) from the atmosphere and thus increases the
risk of failing to meet the long-term target, as reflected in theinfeasibility of this scenario in two of the nine models.6 In the
HST scenario, the models with time horizons to 2100 cluster
into two distinct groups based on how much they overshoot
the long-term budget in 2050.7 Fourmodels (GCAM,MESSAGE,
MERGE-ETL and REMIND) substantially overshoot the budget
by more than 200 Gt CO2 in 2050, while two models (POLES
andWITCH) are roughly at the maximum budget level in 2050
and overshoot the budget only modestly in later decades.8 This
grouping coincides with the tentative model classification
schemedescribed byKriegler et al. [18], as allmodels belonging
to the “high response” group show a high overshoot.9 Models
in these groups generally are more sensitive to carbon prices,
reduce carbon intensity more quickly than energy intensity
and can more rapidly transform the energy system.4.2. Sectoral and temporal composition of the CO2 emissions
budget in scenarios with optimal and weak near-term policies
From the analysis of emissions budgets it becomes clear
that the differences between mitigation pathways with weak
near-termaction and optimal pathways can be characterized in
terms of three distinct temporal phases: (i) a carbon lock-in
phase during the weak policy regime from 2010 to 2030; (ii) a
catch-up phase from 2030 until about 2050 characterized by
very high decarbonization rates; and (iii) a compensation
Fig. 6. Medians of cumulative CO2 emissions after 2010 (red lines) across models together with interquartile ranges (grey boxes) and full model ranges
(whiskers) for four points in time and two scenarios. The colored boxes illustrate the differences between medians from one time step to the next (please note
that they do not represent the medians across models of the emission budgets in those periods). The dark grey box on the left side represents total CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels, industry and land-use from 1920 to 2009 [17,20,21]. The dotted horizontal line marks the 2100 emissions budget target and the letters indicate
the values associated with each model (see Table 1 for full model names).
69C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72phase after 2050, during which excess emissions in the first
half of the century are compensated by emission levels below
those observed in the OPT scenario. Differences in the temporal
allocation of emissions also influence their sectoral allocation
and can be related to the three temporal phases. Currently
nearly half of global CO2 emissions from the energy sector
originate from transformation processes on the supply side of
the energy system, mainly electricity generation (Fig. 1).
Previous studies on ambitious mitigation have pointed out
that supply side emissions aremore easilymitigated so that the
supply share of emissions decreases in mitigation scenarios
[15,16] and can even turn negative. In scenarios with weak
near-term policy (HST and LST), the share of emissions from
the supply side does not decrease much by 2030 (Fig. 1), and
thus, much of the excess emissions in comparison to optimal
near-term scenarios (OPT) during the 2010–2030 period
comes from the supply side (Fig. 7).
During the 2030–2050 period, the change in emissions
between the OPT and HST scenarios is not consistent
among models. While some models (WITCH, MERGE-ETL,
and DNE21+) achieve lower emissions, at least in some
sectors, in the HST scenario, other models (REMIND, POLES,
and MESSAGE) have excess emissions in all sectors in the
2030–2050 period that are similar to those in the 2010–2030
period (Fig. 7).10 For DNE21+, this is directly linked to its 2050
time horizon and the scenario definition, which mandates the
same cumulative emissions over the 2010–2050 period in both
the OPT and HST scenarios.10 GCAM results for the 450-FullTech-OPT and 450-FullTech-HST scenarios
are almost identical (see footnote 4). Furthermore, IMAGE and IMACLIM are
not considered since the 450-FullTech-HST scenario was found infeasible in
both models. See Ref. [5] for discussion of the infeasibility concept.For models with time horizons to 2100, the amount of CO2
emitted during the 2030–2050 period in the weak policy
scenarios can be explained by two factors: 1) path dependency
during the transition to amore stringent climate policy regime,
and 2) the long-term emissions abatement potential. Models
with strong path dependency are less flexible in the rate of
emission reductions achieved in the short-term. Both factors
are influenced by energy system characteristics on both
the supply and demand sides (see Table 1). On the demand
side, a model's path dependency is determined by a model's
short-term price elasticity of energy service demand and
the ability to ramp-up low-carbon demand technologies
(e.g., biofuels, solar heating and electro mobility). On the
supply side, amodel's ability to reduce emissions is constrained
by the ramp-up potential of low-carbon supply options like
nuclear, bioenergy, wind and solar [8] and the ability to
prematurely retire carbon-intensive fossil-based generation
capacity. Similarly, the long-term emissions abatement
potential is determined by assumptions about sectoral energy
demands and their long-term efficiency potentials, low-carbon
energy supply options, and the availability of technologies to
remove CO2 from the atmosphere, such as bioenergy with
carbon capture and storage (BioCCS).
Models with high path dependency and/or high long-term
mitigation potential tend to have higher 2030–2050 emissions,
while models with lower long-termmitigation potentials need
to perform deeper emission reductions in the 2030–2050
period. Since carbon prices reflect the marginal costs of
mitigation in each time period, the prices in 2050 can serve as
proxies for the difficulty and/or necessity of mitigating CO2
from2030 to 2050. As the short-term2030 target increases, the
need for mitigation generally increases for the 2030–2050
period and, thus, the 2050 carbon price also increases (Fig. 8).
However, there is significant variation in the carbon price
among themodelswith two distinct clusters evident in theHST
Fig. 7. Differences in cumulative sectoral CO2 emissions between the 450-FullTech-OPT and 450-FullTech-HST scenarios for all models and three time periods:
2010–2030, 2030–2050 and 2050–2100
70 C. Bertram et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 62–72scenario: those with relatively high carbon prices and those
with low prices. The models with high absolute carbon prices
in 2050 includeMERGE-ETL,WITCH and POLES. The high prices
suggest that the energy systems in these models are pushed
close to the limits of their mitigation potentials. However, the
reasonswhy thesemodels are pushed to their mitigation limits
by 2050 differ.
For MERGE-ETL, the model has difficulty reducing
emissions in this period, particularly in the electricity sector
where no premature retirement of built capacities is possible.
As a result, the model significantly overshoots the long-term
budget in 2050 and compensates with net negative emissions
in the latter half of the century (Fig. 6 and Fig. A1 in the
supplementary online material). By contrast, POLES and
WITCH cannot achieve large net negative emissions in the
long-term and, thus, cannot significantly overshoot the
long-term budget in 2050 and still meet the long-term target
(Fig. 6 and Fig. A1). As a result, these models must put much
more effort into decreasing emissions in the 2030–2050
period, resulting in more mitigation and a larger increase in
carbon prices. The models with more modest carbon prices
includeMESSAGE, REMIND, and GCAM. These models include
a large variety of low-carbon energy supply options and
achieve large net negative emissions in the latter half of
the century and, thus, they can significantly overshoot the
long-term budget in 2050 (Fig. A1).11
In the second half of the century, all models that found the
HST scenario feasible achieve either net negative or zero
cumulative emissions during this period using primarily
biomass with CCS (BioCCS) (Fig. A1). Furthermore, in the
HST scenario, all models, except GCAM,12 reduce cumulative11 Note that the models with the largest net emissions during the 2030–
2050 period (and thus those with the largest overshoots) are also the
models that have the greatest potential for net negative emissions in the
latter half of the century (Fig. 6 and Fig. A1).
12 There is very little difference between the emissions trajectories
for the 450-FullTech-OPT and 450-FullTech-HST scenarios in GCAM (see
footnote 4).emissions by an additional100–250 Gt CO2 relative to the
OPT scenario to compensate for excess emissions up to 2050
(Fig. 7). Most of the additional reduction comes from the
demand sector, with relatively smaller contributions from
the decrease of positive supply emissions and increase of
negative supply emissions associated with BioCCS. This
finding suggests that most of the BioCCS potential is utilized
in both the OPT and HST scenarios so the additional emissions
reductions required in the HST scenario largely come from
reduced energy demand. Twomodels (WITCH andPOLES) have
quite substantial cumulative positive supply side emissions of
150–230 Gt CO2 in the 450-OPT scenario that decrease by
less than 15% despite the roughly doubled CO2 price in the
HST scenario (Fig. A1). This finding suggests that WITCH and
POLES cannot decarbonize the energy supply as much as
other models. Consequently, despite significant CO2 removal
potential, negative emissions are only sufficient to balance
positive emissions and large net negative emissions are not
achieved by these models.
In summary, this section indicates that if models are to
achieve the long-term climate target in the HST scenario, they
must have either the ability to achieve large net negative
emissions in the latter half of the century or the ability to rapidly
transition to low-carbon energy technologies and achieve net
zero emissions in the latter half of the century. In scenarios
with lower energy intensity (LowEI) these requirements are less
severe as the lower baseline final energy demand provides the
models with more flexibility and less urgency in addressing
long-termmitigation. This means that not only can investments
in low carbon technologies be stretched out over longer periods
of time, but also the phase-out of carbon-intensive technologies
can be more gradual. For example, less coal-based electricity
generation capacity is stranded in the LowEI scenarios (Fig. 5b).
As a result, the mitigation costs and carbon prices in LowEI
scenarios are much lower than in scenarios with reference
energy intensity (Fig. 8). For all models with time horizons until
2100, it is less expensive to achieve the cumulative budget with
low energy intensity after two decades of weak climate policy
(450-LowEI-HST) than it is in the scenario with immediate
mitigation and reference energy intensity (450-FullTech-OPT).
Fig. 8. Carbon prices in 2050 (left) and increase in mitigation cost relative to 450-FullTech-OPT scenario (right). Note that the temporal profile of tax paths differs
across models. The letters indicate the values associated with each model (see Table 1 for full model names).
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very similar in the low and reference energy intensity scenarios
in 2030 (Section 3 and especially Fig. 5a).5. Discussion
This study provides several policy-relevant insights into the
implications of weak near-term policies on the achievability of
long-term climate targets, such as the 2 °C target. Under
these policies, all models indicate that most of the foregone
near-term abatement results from increases in coal-fired
electricity generation. Consequently, if global warming is to be
limited to 2 °C in 2100, the models indicate that huge quantities
of installed coal capacity will need to be prematurely retired
between 2030 and 2050. Such a vast global write-off of capital
would be unprecedented in scale. Even though early retirement
avoids extra emissions of up to 200 Gt CO2, weak policy
scenarios essentially guarantee that the long-term cumulative
budgetwill be exceeded around 2050. Therefore, another insight
is the necessity of achieving significant negative emissions in the
second half of the century using biomasswith CCS and terrestrial
sequestration. As near-term emissions targets become less
stringent (i.e., as action is delayed), the magnitude of required
negative emissions increases, which poses a larger risk of failure
in meeting long-term climate objectives.
The results also imply that concerted efforts to improve
energy efficiency will not prevent lock-in of coal-based
electricity capacity, at least if weak near-term polices
are implemented as emission targets. Rather, low energy
demand coupled with emission targets reduces pressure to
decrease carbon intensity on the supply side and, thus, allows
the share of fossil energy to increase in the near-term.
However, in the longer term, this reduced pressure is also
beneficial because it increases the flexibility of the energy
system in making a transition that is consistent with a 2 °C
target. Furthermore, the additional flexibility and reduced
investment on the supply side reduce carbon prices andmitigation costs, which improve the economic feasibility of
achieving the climate objective.
The comparison of model results also suggests that
further research is needed to explore the uncertainties
regarding key assumptions in the models. In particular,
while all results are subject to the general limitations of
long-term energy-economic modeling, it is noteworthy that
the feasibilities and costs of sub-optimal near-term policy
scenarios are strongly dependent on assumptions regarding
the availability and cost of carbon dioxide removal in the
second half of the century [8]. In addition, assumptions
regarding premature retirement and the availability and
relative costs of electricity supply technologies influence the
ability of models to swiftly decarbonize the electricity sector
and cope with large write-offs of stranded capital in the
resource extraction (see also Ref. [19]) and fossil fuel sectors.
Furthermore, most models do not account for potential
political and other non-economic barriers to both stranding
significant electricity capacity and rapidly ramping up
low-carbon technologies. Thus, the models may overestimate
how rapidly an energy system transition can occur. For this
reason, further research is needed to explore the risks and
uncertainties associated with achieving rapid energy system
transformations and large net negative emissions.
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